The Misuse of History
A recent article in The Atlantic is so dumb I'm (almost) at a loss for words. The author has truly lowered the bar for intellectual discourse.
Pictured above is the world’s first operational jet fighter, the Messerschmitt ME 262. According to the Smithsonian’s website:
Nicknamed Schwalbe (Swallow), the Messerschmitt Me 262 surpassed the performance of every other World War II fighter. Faster than the North American P-51 Mustang by 190 kilometers (120 miles) per hour, the Schwalbe restored to the faltering German Luftwaffe a short-lived qualitative superiority that it had enjoyed earlier in the war.
Coming very late during the Second World War, only about 300 of these planes were used in combat. Estimates on the number of air-to-air kills using the ME 262 vary, but generally range from about 500 to over 700 kills for the loss of about 100 of the jets.
This success came despite the German pilots being drastically outnumbered and with their air bases under regular attack. In fact, most of the ME 262 losses occurred either on the airfields or during landing and takeoff, when the lower air speeds made the planes more vulnerable.
Fortunately for the allies, 300 or so of these planes weren’t nearly enough to make a significant difference in the outcome of the war. But the fielding of this plane, along with other advanced weapons like the V-1 flying bomb, demonstrated scientific and engineering prowess not just on par with the Allies, but sometimes even superior.
Simply Abysmal Scholarship
Why am I bringing this up? Because I recently read the article1 referenced by this:
The general point of the article is that a “woke” military (his words, by the way) will always defeat a “hyper-masculine” military, and the author (O’Brien) tries to support this statement with a grossly incorrect summary of combat in the Second World War.
The resulting op-ed is an insult to history, facts and common sense. The author’s version of history gets nearly everything backwards; he claims the U.S. and Great Britain had an enormous technological advantage over the Germans (they didn’t). He claims the Germans had vastly more weapons than the U.S. and Great Britain (they didn’t).
In fact, almost nothing about the Second World War in this article is correct. In an impressive display of anti-scholarship, the author has destroyed all his credibility with a single article.
Let’s start with a comparison of troop losses that sounds impressive:
The combination of education and technology overcame brute force during World War II, when the most militarily skillful and adaptable countries—the United States and the United Kingdom—were able to fight their enemies at a relatively small cost in casualties. The U.K., even though it fought around the world from 1939 to 1945, lost only 384,000 soldiers in combat. The U.S. lost even fewer, suffering approximately 290,000 battle deaths. The German armed forces, by contrast, lost more than 4 million soldiers. (O’Brien)
This statement conveniently leaves out the fact that the majority of German casualties were caused by the Soviet Red Army, not the British and Americans. The losses appear extremely lop-sided if your summary leaves out an entire country (the USSR) and the fighting on the eastern front.
He does admit to a “sickening number of human casualties” on the eastern front while insisting that most of Germany’s strength was in the west. Apparently the German soldiers fighting in Russia were equipped with the equivalent of butter knives.
That the British and American armed forces kept their casualties comparatively low is especially notable because they were confronted with an overwhelming majority of German arms, planes, and ammunition. Because of the sickening number of human casualties, the fighting on the Eastern Front between the Nazis and Soviets is widely deemed World War II’s largest engagement, but Germany had to send far more of its war production to fight the British and Americans than it did to fight the U.S.S.R. (O’Brien)
This entire paragraph is so ridiculous that the English language contains no words strong enough to characterize such an extreme disconnect from reality. The Allies outproduced the Axis countries in every important category of military equipment, and by huge margins. O’Brien’s assertion is so wrong that the average reader would be better informed if he had never written the article at all.
Let’s talk about tanks
The Second World War saw the first widespread use of tanks, and the German military pioneered the best tactics with them. But did they have “overwhelming” numbers? No, instead the situation was the other way around.
Jane Information Service is a highly respected publisher of military history and data, and is a frequently relied upon source. Here are tank production numbers from Jane’s World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles by Leland Ness:
The Second World War spanned from 1939 to 1945. Ness has started with 1937 tank production, which makes sense given many of those vehicles saw service in the war. Ness has stopped after 1944, which again makes sense since 1945 was only a partial year - German production stopped, (it’s hard to build tanks with Allied troops in the building) and the Allies were ramping down their own production as well. Tanks built in the U.S. in early 1945 wouldn’t get to the front lines in Europe in time to be of use, so there was no sense building more of them.
The difference in numbers is staggering, but in the opposite direction from what is stated in the op-ed. All Axis tank production is less than 49,000, while U.S. and British production alone is 116,000, with the Soviets adding another 94,000 by themselves. Allied tank production exceeded Axis production by a factor of four. And note the U.S. and Britain were actually slowing down production after 1943 - they clearly felt they had more than enough tanks.
Nearly all these tanks were used in the European theater (eastern and western fronts). Only a small number of Allied tanks were used in the Pacific, where the jungle terrain severely limited their usefulness. In Europe the Germans were nearly always outnumbered in tanks.
The Allies built more aircraft too
As another quick example aircraft production was also lopsided, although in this case Japan’s output is large enough to be a significant fraction of the total.
Sources vary on these numbers, but generally show about 200,000 for American production, 100,000 each for the UK and USSR, and fewer than 100,000 for for Germany. These totals are for combat aircraft - the numbers are even more lopsided if we include transports, trainers, etc.
Also keep in mind the U.S. and UK were building large numbers of big strategic bombers, each of which cost as much as several smaller aircraft - while the Axis powers built virtually none.
The numbers for nearly everything (artillery, machine guns, etc.) follow this pattern - the Allies built several times more of all the types of weapons needed in a modern war. The Second World War was really a war of competing economies, and the Germans were operating at a huge disadvantage even before the US formally entered the war. This overwhelming numerical superiority was due to the enormous size of the combined manufacturing base of the Allies.
How did this work out in the field? Britannica has concise summary of the Second World War, so let’s look at a few sections about combat on the western front (note how easy this research is - we’re just reading an encyclopedia). The Allied superiority in the amount of war material is mentioned constantly.
Invasion of Italy
After defeating the relatively weak German and Italian forces in North Africa, the first major invasion of the European continent by the British and Americans was in Sicily.
Sicily
Most of the defenders were Italian troops, supported by two German divisions and the German Luftwaffe (air force).
Having failed to save its forces in Tunisia, the Axis had only 10 Italian divisions of various sorts and two German panzer2 units stationed on the island of Sicily at midsummer 1943. The Allies, meanwhile, were preparing to throw some 478,000 men into the island—150,000 of them in the first three days of the invasion. (Britannica)
The Italians had around 200,000 troops on the island and the two German units added about 30,000 ground troops and 30,000 Luftwaffe personnel. But the Allies had an important advantage.
The Allies’ air superiority in the Mediterranean theatre was so great by this time—more than 4,000 aircraft against some 1,500 German and Italian ones—that the Axis bombers had been withdrawn from Sicily in June to bases in north-central Italy. (Britannica)
So the Italian and German troops operated without air support for the duration of the campaign. Between lack of German air support, and the big guns of the Allied ships offshore, the defenders on Sicily were heavily outmatched.
Salerno
On the Italian mainland the allies landed 170,000 men at Salerno, which was initially defended by only a single German division. Despite this massive advantage, the allies needed six days to secure the landing areas.
The landing on the “shin” of Italy, at Salerno, just south of Naples, was begun on September 9, by the mixed U.S.–British 5th Army, under U.S. General Mark Clark. Transported by 700 ships, 55,000 men made the initial assault, and 115,000 more followed up. At first they were faced only by the German 16th Panzer Division; but Kesselring, though he had only eight weak divisions to defend all southern and central Italy, had had time to plan since the fall of Mussolini and had been expecting a blow at the “shin.” His counterstroke made the success of the Salerno landing precarious for six days, and it was not until October 1 that the 5th Army entered Naples. (Britannica)
The Allied forces eventually succeeded - with a massive advantage in artillery and air support, plus support from large caliber naval guns.
Invasion of France
The D-Day landings were on 6 June 1944 and by November the British and Americans were already approaching the German frontier, stopping as their supply lines became dangerously stretched. How did they manage this advance? More men, and way more tanks, aircraft and artillery.
The Allies’ amazing advance of 350 miles in a few weeks was thus brought to a halt. In early September the U.S. and British forces had had a combined superiority of 20 to 1 in tanks and 25 to 1 in aircraft over the Germans, but by November 1944 the Germans still held both the Ruhr Valley and the Saarland, after having been so near collapse in the west in early September that one or the other of those prizes could have easily been taken by the Allies. (Britannica)
This is an actual example of an “overwhelming majority” in war material, but to the advantage of the Allies, not the Germans. O’Brien has inverted history. Italy and France were the two main operating areas for the Allies in western Europe, and the balance of forces was consistently the opposite of what O’Brien tells us.
Why are the Germans so weak on the western front from the moment Britain and America start invading the continent? Because the bulk of the German military was in the east, being ground down by the Red Army.
In the west, the Allies treated equipment as cheap but the lives of soldiers as very dear. So when they ran into strong resistance, they brought in massive amounts of artillery, aircraft and tanks, to hammer away at the defenders before continuing their advance.
And in fact, the low American and British casualties were a result of the exact tactics for which the O’Brien criticizes the Russians: the use of massive artillery and aerial bombardment prior to risking any ground troops.
Some big tank battles
To emphasize the relative commitment of material the Germans made to the eastern and western fronts, let’s look at some significant events. First, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was simply massive:
For the campaign against the Soviet Union, the Germans allotted almost 150 divisions containing a total of about 3,000,000 men. Among these were 19 panzer divisions, and in total the “Barbarossa” force had about 3,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and 2,500 aircraft. It was in effect the largest and most powerful invasion force in human history. (Britannica)
Even with this huge force, the Germans were numerically inferior. One example of the fighting was the Battle of Raseiniai, which saw 240 German tanks versus 750 Soviet tanks, with the Germans destroying 700 Soviet tanks thanks to skillful coordination with tactical aircraft.
Also during Barbarossa, the Battle of Brody involved 1,000 German tanks facing 3,000 Soviet tanks, but once again their superior tactics combined with the use of air support resulted in a big German victory.
At Kursk, two years after Barbarossa, a series of battles took place over several weeks that saw 3,000 German tanks and 5,000 Soviet tanks employed. By this time in the war, the Red Army’s tactics had improved significantly and although the Germans again lost fewer men and tanks, they failed to achieve their main objective.
The Germans employed millions of troops and thousands of tanks against the Soviets, but there were few tank battles of this scope on the western front. Two are of the same scale as the battles that had been occurring for years on the eastern front.
The largest tank battle in the west after D-Day was Operation Goodwood, a British offensive with 1,100 British tanks attacking a German force with 370 tanks. But the Germans by this time had the powerful Tiger I and Tiger II, and the British ended up losing 250-300 tanks while destroying only about 75. Most of the German losses were to attacks from the air, where the British and Americans had complete dominance.
The only major German offensive on the western front after D-Day was the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans secretly massed their forces for months, then attacked with over 1,000 tanks and tank destroyers. The Allies countered by reinforcing with thousands (plural) of tanks, tank destroyers and other vehicles. The battle ended after the weather cleared and the Allies sent in 5,000 aircraft to overwhelm the German formations.
Unlike O’Brien’s characterization of the war, the bulk of the German tanks were on the eastern front, and they were consistently facing numerically superior forces on both fronts. Superior German tactics are credited for many of their victories, and in other cases they have a technological advantage that results in lopsided losses - in their favor.
Everything is backwards
Reading O’Brien’s op-ed, anyone who is ignorant of the details of WWII would finish with a gross misunderstanding of the war. In reality, this is a more accurate view of the war:
Germany began the war with a slight technological advantage. The advantage in weapons technology went back and forth between the two sides, but the Germans were able to produce technologically competitive weapons up to the end.
The Allies out produced the Axis countries, several times over, in every category. This was mostly due to their combined economies being much larger, and partially due to superior manufacturing techniques.
Most of the German war production went to the eastern front, not the western front. A partial exception to this was in aircraft - Britain and America were building huge numbers of high altitude bombers to attack German cities, so the best German planes were in the west.
The vast majority of German casualties were caused by the Red Army, not Britain and America. This wasn’t because the Germans on the eastern front were poorly equipped, it’s because that’s where most of the fighting took place. In addition, the combat effectiveness of the Red Army improved significantly throughout the war.
The German Luftwaffe (air force) was destroyed by the American and British air forces - and this was arguably the biggest American contribution to the actual fighting.
As the war progressed the British and Americans used their enormous superiority in material, and their complete control of the air, to win battles while limiting casualties. (The sensible approach if one has these advantages.)
The article made no mention of strategic resources, but I would be remiss not to mention that Germany was almost completely lacking in oil. Fuel shortages plagued the Germans throughout the war, and some of their advances were stopped by lack of fuel rather than by enemy action. (Remember, amateurs talk tactics but experts study logistics.)
O’Brien completely mischaracterizes the largest war in human history, and tries to use this as support for his argument that the Ukrainians will win the war because their military is so very progressive. And by extension, this means the US military should be the same.
Now on to Russia and Ukraine
Here’s how O’Brien opens his op-ed:
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his generals aren’t the only people who think that the more ruthless, hypermasculine, and reflexively brutal an army is, the better it performs on the battlefield. That view also has fans in the United States. (O’Brien)
He begins by conflating “masculine” with “ruthless” and “brutal” as though these things naturally occur together, a neat rhetorical trick. But there’s no evidence Putin, or the Russians in general, think a “reflexively brutal” army is more effective - he’s trying to tell us what other people think, based on his perception of recruiting ads.
Last year, Senator Ted Cruz recirculated a TikTok video that contrasted a Russian military-recruitment ad, which showed a male soldier getting ready to kill people, with an American recruitment video that told the story of a female soldier—the daughter of two mothers—who enlisted partly to challenge stereotypes. (O’Brien)
So prior to regaling us with tales of the huge losses inflicted on the Germans, O’Brien explains that training soldiers to kill is not as important as challenging stereotypes.
He then tells us that Ted Cruz and Tucker Carlson (both of whom have criticized “woke” ideology in the American military) are of the same misguided mindset as Putin. And of course they’re all wrong:
Arguments like these were much easier to make before Putin unleashed his muscle-bound and decidedly unwoke fighting machine on the ostensibly weak Ukrainians, only to see it perform catastrophically. (O’Brien)
O’Brien hasn’t told us what he thinks the Russian’s strategic aims are for this war, so we have no marker against which to measure their success or failure. My first article about the war, Grand Strategy, proposes what would be a sensible goal for the Russians, which is strategic control of the Sea of Azov. If this is truly their goal then they’re doing well.
O’Brien, on the other hand, seems to be living in some kind of bubble of unreality, in which the Ukrainians win every battle but can’t win the war.
From the moment the Russian military crossed the border, the Ukrainians have outfought it, revealing it to be inflexible and intellectually vapid. (O’Brien)
Somehow the Ukrainians are outfighting the Russians at every turn, but the Russians are still occupying large (and critical) areas of Ukraine. For example, the Russians took control of the city of Enerhodar (“Energy’s gift”) early - a city which contains the largest nuclear power plant in Europe plus a thermal power plant, for a total of about 15% of all the electrical generating capacity in Ukraine.
But this is how O’Brien sees the war:
The Battle of the Donbas, the war’s longest engagement, which started in late April and is still under way, exposed the Russian army at its worst. For months, it directed the bulk of personnel and equipment toward the center of a battle line running approximately from Izyum to Donetsk. (O’Brien)
In an article complaining about what the author perceives as the simplistic approach to war as conducted by the “hyper-masculine,” the author has demonstrated the simplistic thinking he’s mocking. He has ignored (or is unaware of) the significance of the Russian advance to Kherson in the west, or the importance of clearing out resistance in Mariopol early in the war.
Instead of breaking through Ukrainian lines and sending armored forces streaking forward rapidly, as many analysts had predicted, the Russian army opted to make painfully slow, incremental advances, by simply blasting the area directly in front of it. (O’Brien)
This may simply mean the analysts O’Brien is consulting were wrong about Russian strategy, which wouldn’t be surprising given the bubble in which he appears to operate. But also of importance, what he’s describing is exactly what the Americans and British were doing in Europe in WWII, and it’s the opposite of stupid. If you have more big guns than your enemy, use them.
Just like those analysts he mentions, the author assumes he understands the overall Russian strategic plan for the war. Because it’s not playing out the way he thinks it should the Russians must be incompetent. In fact, O’Brien makes a ridiculous statement that again destroys his own credibility.
I struggle to think of another case in the past 100 years when a major military power has performed as poorly against an adversary it was heavily favored to defeat. (O’Brien)
And how, one wonders, would the author rate the American military in the Vietnam War? The contrast in military might between the two sides could hardly be more extreme, yet America was unable to dictate the outcome of the war.
Going back to his own example of WWII, prior to the war the French army was seen as the most powerful in Europe. Yet France fell to the Germans in only six weeks - an outcome that military experts at the time viewed as simply impossible.
On the other hand the Soviet Union, originally viewed as much weaker than France, was the country that broke Hitler’s military.
Study history, not propaganda
The current war is ongoing, and the propaganda is rampant - making it very difficult to assess the progress of both sides in real time. We won’t know the full story behind the major engagements until sometime after the war, but in the meantime O’Brien assumes he has an accurate view of events, and he declares that it supports his opinions about how a modern military should operate. Given how clearly biased he is on the war, none of his assertions about the fighting can be given any weight.
As for the op-ed itself, the entire screed is just naked propaganda for O’Brien’s own “woke” agenda for the American military. And like most advocates of that agenda, he won’t let something as inconsequential as facts get in the way.
Original really dumb article:
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/russia-ukraine-woke-military-tucker-carlson/671569/
Archived copy of dumb article:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220928145420/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/russia-ukraine-woke-military-tucker-carlson/671569/
Panzer is what the Germans called their tanks, and most historians use this term when discussing German tanks. It’s an abbreviation of Panzerkampfwagen, which can be roughly translated as “armored combat vehicle” and is usually abbreviated PzKpfw. The infamous Tiger tank was the PzKpfw VI (Roman numeral six).
Thats hilarious. What a clown. Nice clarifications from your end.