Grand Strategy
Pundits are arguing over who is winning the war in Ukraine, but none of them have asked what, for the Russians, winning means.
The news is full of discussion of the ongoing war in Ukraine, most of it very uninformed (as is typical). Much of the commentary appears to assume that Russia has invaded Ukraine to replace the current government, or take possession of the country, and the war is a struggle that may determine the future existence of Ukraine.
Before judging the status of a large conflict one must first ask what the strategic goals are. For the war in Ukraine we can make a good guess about Russia’s true aims by looking at the overall strategic situation in the area of the Black Sea.
There’s a well-known quote, attributed to General Robert H. Barrow, which is extremely relevant to this situation: “Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.”
Taking this to heart, and studying the logistics, will show us Russia’s main purpose in Ukraine. There are a lot of details to cover first and we’re going to start someplace far from the conflict - the Caspian Sea.
The map above shows the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov (just north of the Black Sea) and the Caspian Sea. Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea are the Caucasus Mountains, and south of the Caucasus lies Georgia. Just north of the Caucasus, towards the east side of the isthmus, lies the city of Grozny. This area north of the mountains is a significant source of oil.
The growth of new Soviet oil fields reduced the relative importance of the area, but with new oil finds in the 1950s, it has remained a significant producer. Pipelines run through Grozny to Makhachkala on the Caspian Sea, Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and the Donets Basin. (https://www.britannica.com/place/Grozny)
But all the oil isn’t piped west (Novorossiysk contains the main Russian naval base in the Black Sea), or north further into Russia. Some of those pipelines instead run east to refineries in the city of Makhachkala on the Caspian Sea.
Present-day Makhachkala is a seaport linking the North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and southern Ukraine with the western regions of Kazakhstan. It also serves as the terminal of an oil pipeline from Grozny. (https://www.britannica.com/place/Makhachkala)
Here’s a pair of tankers at the port in Makhachkala, one being filled from the storage tanks onshore and the other being positioned by a tugboat.
A short distance away, the Russian navy also has a presence in Makhachkala.
The Caspian Sea is landlocked and there aren’t any shipbuilding yards along its coast capable of building these ships, so where did such large vessels come from? They were built in Russia, and transferred to the Caspian Sea via the Volga River and its various tributaries.
Years ago a channel was created at the north end of the Caspian Sea, where the Volga River empties into the sea. Ships following this channel proceed onto the Volga River in Russia.
On the Volga just north of the Caspian Sea is the port city of Astrakhan. Here are two ships under construction on the shoreline in Astrakhan:
Following the Volga River north from Astrakhan leads to the modern city of Volgograd (formerly known as Stalingrad). Volgograd is located on the west bank of the Volga River, right where the Don River curves east to within fifty or so miles of the Volga.
The Soviets built the Volga-Don Canal connecting those two rivers. Here’s one of many of those ships passing through a lock on the canal.
Once on the Don River, these ships can continue westward, passing through Rostov-on-Don, and from there into the Sea of Azov.
The Volga is the central artery of a transportation system that runs from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea in the south.
The Volga is joined to the Baltic Sea by the Volga–Baltic Waterway, which, in turn, is joined to the White Sea (via Lake Onega) by the White Sea–Baltic Canal; to the Moscow River, and hence to Moscow, by the Moscow Canal; and to the Sea of Azov by the Volga–Don Ship Canal. The river has thus become integrated with virtually the entire waterway system of eastern Europe. (https://www.britannica.com/place/Volga-River)
The Sea of Azov connects to the Black Sea, which is itself connected to the Mediterranean Sea. This provides a water-borne transport route for oil and other goods from inside Russia to any foreign nation with a port, as well as a route for naval vessels to access the Black Sea.
Ships and cargo can be moved from the Baltic to the Mediterranean (and vice versa) using these waterways. The Volga river system allows Russia to build ships inland, then transfer them to the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea along waterways internal to Russia.
But there’s a critical choke point in the Sea of Azov. As ships leave the Don River, they pass through a narrow sea corridor along the southern coast of Ukraine. The territory on the south shore, and the north shore just west of Rostov, is Russia. But the rest of the northern shore is Ukraine.
The lane south of Mariopol is less than 30 miles wide - well within the range of land based anti-ship missiles such as the American RGM-84 Harpoon (range about 86 miles). Basing those missiles in southern Ukraine would mean that Russia’s maritime access to the Black Sea could be cut at any time. If Ukraine were a NATO member, this would mean the U.S. could (through NATO) control this vital sea lane.
Crimea, the other critical part
To fully understand Russia’s military operations we also need to look at a few areas in southern Ukraine and Crimea. First let’s move southwest and take a closer look at Crimea, occupied by the Russians since 2014.
Essentially a peninsula, originally the only land access to Crimea was from the north, until a bridge to the east side of the peninsula was built by the Russians in 2018. One important strategic aspect of Crimea is water - or, more specifically, the lack of it. Years ago the Soviets built a large aqueduct (which starts in Kherson) to supply water from the Dnieper River down to Crimea.
Soon after Russia took control of Crimea, the Ukrainians built a dam on that aqueduct, stopping the flow of water (ostensibly to their own citizens in an occupied region). Here’s that dam, located right on the border between Crimea and Ukraine.
These images have not yet been updated, but the Russians have reportedly removed this dam and restored the flow of water to Crimea.
Moving north from Crimea we find the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (an oblast is an administrative division).
The Dnieper River in Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast forms a formidable, natural defensive barrier. This is probably why the Soviets chose to do some strategically important construction on the southeast side of the river.
For example, this is the city of Enerhodar in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, located on the south bank (so east side) of the Dnieper River, just below the city of Zaporizhzhia.
The city was built specifically to be a power generating center and contains the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station (5.7 gigawatts), as well as the Zaporizhzhia thermal power station (2.85 gigawatts). The combined capacity of those two plants (8.55 gigawatts) represents about 15% of the estimated 55 gigawatts total electrical generating capacity in Ukraine.
Poking The Bear
Although Ukraine had been a Russian ally, when Ukrainian President Yanukovych decided not to sign a trade agreement with the EU in 2013 widespread demonstrations and riots broke out. These ended in the collapse of the government and the election of a much more western friendly regime in February 2014, after which Russia responded by seizing control of Crimea.
In 2017 Zelensky was elected President and soon after discussions began about integrating Ukraine into NATO - despite assurances, when the Soviet Union broke up, that this would never happen.
There was a critical escalation of this plan in 2021 when the Ukrainian military began joint military exercises with the U.S. and Great Britain. From an article published in January 2021 by the Ukrainian news agency Unian:
The maneuvers will launch in September this year at all military training grounds, covering a number of regions , as well as in the waters of the Black and Azov Seas under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The Ukrainian military started conducting military exercises with the U.S. in the Sea of Azov - right on Russia’s metaphorical doorstep. One goal of those naval operations was very likely the blocking of Russian access to the Black Sea during a hypothetical war.
If Ukraine joined NATO and the U.S. began placing anti-ship missiles in southern Ukraine, this would give the U.S. the ability to cut Russian access to the Black Sea for commercial shipping as well as the Russian Navy at any time.
Russia would be prevented from shipping goods to foreign ports through the Black Sea, and they would be unable to support or reinforce their own naval forces there.
The map, and the objective, that matters
Considering the strategic and logistical factors reviewed so far, the main Russian objective for the war in Ukraine is most likely strategic control of the Sea of Azov.
With this in mind we can now look at the whole region of southeast Ukraine and review Russian operations at the start of the war.
To secure access to the Black Sea Russia must have control of the area surrounding the Sea of Azov (or at least deny control to their future opponents). This means either control of, or strategic alliance with, the Donbass region (Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts) as well as the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. This, together with Crimea, secures the Sea of Azov and Russian access to the Black Sea (and by extension, the Mediterranean and the rest of the world).
[Note that we run into the issue of romanization of city names from languages that use the Cyrillic alphabet. Luhansk and Lugansk are two romanizations for the name of the same city, and both are used in this discussion depending on the source. Nothing else should be inferred from the choice of spelling in these cases. For a discussion of romanization of city names see my article on Київ.]
With this perspective, some details from early in the war become more clear. The attack from the northeast and aimed toward Kiev was almost certainly a feint, intended to force the Ukrainians to deploy powerful military units northward to protect the city, thus leaving them weaker in the south where the real Russian intentions lay. The same is probably true about operations around Kharkov.
Having spent years supporting the Donbass region against the government of Ukraine, the Russians had also prepared a path for themselves along southern Ukraine all the way to Crimea.
At the outbreak of the war Russian forces drove quickly through southern Ukraine and directly to their ultimate goal of Kherson, bypassing some of the toughest Ukrainian strong points along the way. Once those strong points (like Mariopol) were isolated, the Russians carefully surrounded and assaulted them.
Occupying this region in southern Ukraine means the Russians have already accomplished their primary strategic goal - control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia south and east of the Dnieper River as well as the Donbass region all along the Sea of Azov.
Maintaining control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia south and east of the Dnieper gives Russia secure access to Crimea over land, ensures the supply of water and power, and makes depriving Russia of Crimea via a land assault very difficult.
Extending this territory eastward to include the Donbass connects it directly to Russia through a region whose inhabitants are already at least partially pro-Russian (or at least, anti-Ukrainian), which contains further valuable natural resources, and which also (most importantly) occupies the northern shore of the Sea of Azov.
The map from the beginning of the article showed the only part of Ukraine the Russians actually consider critical. Here it is again, with the labels:
The Sea of Azov will effectively be part of Russia since they possess all land bordering the sea. The parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia north and west of the Dnieper, and the occupied areas of northern Ukraine, they will be willing to negotiate away.
But Russia will take a very firm stance on the southern regions - they will keep control of these areas at all costs. They see the loss of access to the Sea of Azov as an existential threat, and one of the first steps toward dismantling Russia itself.
Putin’s address, and general mobilization
As I was writing this up, Putin made an address in which he announced a more general mobilization of Russian military forces. In this address Putin made clear that all four Oblasts we’ve been discussing (Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson) are to be “liberated” from the current regime.
From Putin’s address of 21 September 2022:
Today I am addressing you – all citizens of our country, people of different generations, ages and ethnicities, the people of our great Motherland, all who are united by the great historical Russia, soldiers, officers and volunteers who are fighting on the frontline and doing their combat duty, our brothers and sisters in the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions and other areas that have been liberated from the neo-Nazi regime.
He clearly states that Russian leaders believe the West intends to break up Russia.
The goal of that part of the West is to weaken, divide and ultimately destroy our country. They are saying openly now that in 1991 they managed to split up the Soviet Union and now is the time to do the same to Russia, which must be divided into numerous regions that would be at deadly feud with each other.
And he reiterates the original goal of freeing the Donbass region:
The main goal of this operation, which is to liberate the whole of Donbass, remains unaltered.
Putin emphasizes that Russia will support referendums in all four of the regions we have been discussing, and they expect those referendums to be for independence from Ukraine.
The parliaments of the Donbass people’s republics and the military-civilian administrations of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions have adopted decisions to hold referendums on the future of their territories and have appealed to Russia to support this.
For emphasis Putin repeatedly talks about all four regions in the address, and mentions them together as a group half a dozen times.
I would like to emphasise that we will do everything necessary to create safe conditions for these referendums so that people can express their will. And we will support the choice of future made by the majority of people in the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.
Volunteers already fighting in those regions will be given the same status as members of the Russian military, including pay, medical care and benefits. They will essentially be integrated with the Russian military.
As you know, professional military personnel serving under contract are taking part in the special military operation. Fighting side by side with them are volunteer units – people of different ethnicities, professions and ages who are real patriots. They answered the call of their hearts to rise up in defence of Russia and Donbass.
In this connection, I have already issued instructions for the Government and the Defence Ministry to determine the legal status of volunteers and personnel of the military units of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics. It must be the same as the status of military professionals of the Russian army, including material, medical and social benefits. Special attention must be given to organising the supply of military and other equipment for volunteer units and Donbass people’s militia.
Notice that Putin doesn’t mention other areas of Ukraine. The Russians didn’t try to take Kiev because they never intended to occupy Kiev. They’re not trying to hold onto Kharkov because there’s no long term strategic value in holding Kharkov. The Russians occupied large areas in the north but haven’t aggressively defended them because they have no intention of keeping control of those areas and won’t waste valuable Russian troops defending them.
The Russians have already achieved their main goal (strategic control of the Sea of Azov) and they won’t be giving up control of the regions they occupy in southeastern Ukraine, regardless of the pressure put on them. Doing so would place Russia in a very weak strategic position for a future conflict with the West, and they believe that conflict will happen if they don’t take firm steps now to prevent it.
A brief summary
Here, in chunks of 280 characters or less, is a summary of my personal opinion about the reason for, and goals of, the current Ukraine war:
Strategically, the war in Ukraine is primarily about trade. A very large amount of international trade is ocean freight, and Russia’s two main entry points for that trade are the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.
The changing political and military alignment of Ukraine potentially puts Russian shipping via the Black Sea in great peril. So when the Russia-friendly government in Ukraine fell in 2014, Russia seized control of Crimea to protect their access to the Black Sea.
Ignoring the implications of this move, the U.S. proceeded with plans to integrate Ukraine into NATO, and began conducting joint military exercises in and near the Sea of Azov.
This area includes a narrow choke point through which Russian ships can easily be denied access to the Black Sea. Placing anti-ship weapons near the Sea of Azov is the metaphorical equivalent of a knife at the throat of the Russian economy.
Russia has therefore taken control of the regions necessary for strategic control of the Sea of Azov, preventing its potential use to trap their navy and strangle their trade. In the event of a future great-power conflict, they cannot lose control of this area.
Invading northern Ukraine was a tactical ploy to make seizing Donbass, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson much easier. They will either withdraw, or negotiate withdrawal, from the northern areas but they will hold the areas around the Sea of Azov at all costs.
They firmly believe its loss would be a direct threat to the continued existence of Russia, and recent U.S. actions have only strengthened their belief.
For Russia, there’s no sense in giving up control of the Sea of Azov to prevent an immediate war with NATO, only to increase the risk of losing a future war because they gave up this control.
The Americans, and NATO, are ignoring a fundamental fact: you don’t prevent a fight by taking out a knife and attempting to place it against another man’s throat. That is, however, how you start a fight.
For more details on all three choke points between Rostov and the Mediterranean see the next article on this topic:
This makes sense. However, if it was true, and indeed the primary war goal was the liberation of the Sea of Azov, which is essentially achieved, why would Putin go through the lengths of disgusing this war goal behind "purging the nazi regime in Kiev" time and time again.
That makes no sense to me. He would voluntarely paint himself as a murderer, when actually revealing the real war goal to the world would very likely have a smaller cost in terms of manpower, reputation and sanctions. Why go through these lengths and inflict more pain on yourself, than is necessary.
So from that point of view, i think your argument can be easily refuted.
It stands to reason that control of the sea of azov might be secondary, lesser wargoal. But Putins continues speeches in my opinion clearly make the case for a different war goal.
While the danger imagined by the Russians is well described, you should be as critical of Russian ideology as you are of that of the west. It is absurd to suggest NATO would have planned to attack Russia. As Putin has said his plan is to restore Sovietunion and he started his career with killing more then hunderthousands in Grozny in a war he started just to be president. I am absolutely biased: my mother survived Stalinism and the blockade of Leningrad and for me it was clear early that Putin is restoring an empire based on rude force. His moves are not defensive as you suggest but wants to establish Russia as Superpower at all costs. Im am sure you know the dictum of Brezinski: Without a European Ukraine Russia's destiny is that of a backward power.