The previous article discussed why it’s reasonable to believe a key (if not the key) Russian objective for the war in Ukraine is control of the Sea of Azov. But this is only part of the picture regarding commercial shipping.
There are actually three choke points for Russian ships between the Don River and the Mediterranean. In addition to the northern channel of the Sea of Azov, there’s the Kerch Strait and the Turkish Straits.
Transit to Russia temporarily stopped
Prior to 2014, the easiest place to blockade Russian shipping was the Kerch strait, on the east side of Crimea. Here’s the location of the strait, which provides access between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
The two large Russian naval bases at Novorossiysk and Sevastopol are located south of the strait, so Russian navy ships must traverse the Kerch Strait to access the Sea of Azov.
Modern commercial vessels are tracked via GPS, and shortly after the start of the 2022 war this tracking data showed commercial ships accumulating in the Kerch Strait. It’s not clear whether these ships stopped in the strait because the Russian navy declared the Sea of Azov off-limits for commercial vessels, or if the shipping companies themselves were concerned about the risk of traveling within range of shore based missiles during a war.
Of course the Russians have also been taking steps to prevent commercial ships from reaching Ukraine, and on the other side of the Black Sea the Ukrainian ports are currently blocked.
Blockade of Odessa
Although Russia controls the ports in the Sea of Azov, Odessa and Mykolaiv are still under Ukrainian control. However, there have been very few ships calling at these ports.
On the commercial side, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) designated the Northern Black Sea and the Sea of Azov a ‘Warlike Operations Area’ forcing shipping companies to think twice before sending ships manned by innocent civilians into Russian or Ukrain waters. This, combined with soaring insurance rates, has effectively blockaded Ukraine from commercial trade, military sealift, humanitarian aid, and refugee evacuation. (gcaptain.com1)
Russia didn’t immediately announce a formal blockade, but the remaining Ukrainian controlled ports were effectively shut down because commercial vessels won’t risk trying to reach them.
However, position data from container ships show that Ukraine is largely cut off from international maritime trade. No large container ship has called at the country’s most important port, Odesa on the Black Sea, since the outbreak of war. (gcaptain.com)
One of the risks faced by commercial vessels is the presence of mines in the Black Sea south of Odessa and Mykolaiv.
Mines
An interview with a Ukrainian official in Odessa discussed the use of mines by both the Russians and the Ukrainians.
Shortly after it invaded Ukraine at the end of February, Russia said that significant areas of the Black Sea were closed to commercial traffic. Since then, it has blocked safe passage to and from Ukraine by closing the Kerch Strait, tightening control of the Sea of Azov and stationing warships off Ukrainian ports. It also has set sea mines in the Black Sea and repeatedly has bombed infrastructure at the ports. (world-grain.com2)
According to the official being quoted by the article, the Ukrainians placed mines to block their ports from Russian naval vessels and the Russians put mines further out in the Black Sea.
In addition to some mines Ukraine used to block access to its ports from Russian warships, there are 400 to 600 mines that were spread out by Russia in the Black Sea as it moved toward Ukraine, Bratchuk said. (world-grain.com)
According to this same official, most of those mines originally belonged to the Ukrainians.
“Most of them were stolen by Russia when they occupied Crimea eight years ago,” he said. “Now they are using them to partially block Ukraine and partially to blame Ukraine if any other ships are hit by those mines, because they were owned by Ukraine before.” (world-grain.com)
This means Ukraine had hundreds of mines stockpiled in Crimea prior to 2014. Those mines could have been deployed in the Kerch Strait, but instead they’re being used to block access to ports in western Ukraine.
The mines weren’t the only anti-ship weapons the Russians obtained when they took control of Crimea.
Missiles
The Ukrainians also had coastal defense missile systems in Crimea. From the Kyiv Post, 2 August 20193:
Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 was a crippling blow to Ukraine’s maritime missile power.
Together with up to 80 percent of the country’s naval force, all of the Rubezh mobile coastal defense missile systems (NATO reporting name SSC-3 Styx) were seized by Russian armed forces. (Kyiv Post)
An older system, the Rubezh uses Termit anti-ship cruise missiles with much shorter range than the American Harpoon.
Having lost all their Soviet-era anti-ship weapons, the Ukrainians needed to either build their own systems or obtain them from other countries, and appear to have been doing both.
Neptune, built in Ukraine
In 2016 Ukraine began developing their own coastal defense system. From the Kyiv Post again, on 15 March 20194:
Ukraine has moved closer to finally setting up its coastal defense against Russia as the country’s navy obtained the very first units of cruise missile system RK-360MC Neptune, despite long and painful hurdles on the way.
The first training missile battery joined the navy’s only artillery brigade on March 15, as part of the formation’s newly-created coastal defense missile battalion.
“This system was designed to defend Ukraine in the Azov and the Black seas,” as the navy’s top commanding officer, Rear Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, asserted during the delivery ceremony in Odesa. (Kyiv Post)
It’s not clear how many of these missiles have been delivered, but this is the missile system the Ukrainians say was used to sink the Russian missile cruiser Moskva.
Harpoon and the HCDS
The Harpoon is the main anti ship weapon carried by most NATO ships, and has air launched and ground launched variants.
The A/U/RGM-84 Harpoon is an all-weather, over-the-horizon, anti-ship missile system that provides the Navy with a common missile for air and ship launches. The weapon system uses mid-course guidance with a radar seeker to attack surface ships. Its active radar guidance, low-level, sea-skimming cruise trajectory, terminal mode sea-skim or pop-up maneuvers and warhead design, assure high survivability and effectiveness. Harpoon is capable of being launched from surface ships, submarines, shore batteries or aircraft. (www.navair.navy.mil5)
The Harpoon Coastal Defense System (HCDS) consists (at a minimum) of a military truck with a launcher holding four Block II Harpoon missiles, plus the control system.
Denmark already possessed two Harpoon based coastal defense systems and announced they were sending one of them to Ukraine.
Denmark is to supply a Harpoon anti-ship launcher and an undisclosed number of missiles to Ukraine to help defend its coast, the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd J Austin III announced on 23 May. (Janes6)
Ukraine may have also received a separate working Harpoon system from the U.S. military. Bill Laplante, the Department of Defense acquisitions chief, was quoted about it in an article from Defense One.
Ukrainian forces who sank a Russian warship with Harpoon missiles in June were trained by the United States, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer said. (Defense One7)
Based on LaPlante’s description, it appears the U.S. put together a system similar to the HCDS and trained the Ukrainians on how to use it.
“We got them off the ship, put them on some flatbed trucks, put the Harpoons, the modules on the flatbed truck, and then a different flatbed truck for the power source, connected a cable between it, figured out was exportable, brought the Ukrainians to train on it over Memorial Day weekend, in our country, over Memorial Day weekend, and the next week two Russian ships were sunk with those Harpoons,” he said. (Defense One)
It’s not clear what two ships he’s referring to. The week after Memorial Day would be the end of May, but the Ukrainians haven’t claimed sinking any ships during that time.
Two Russian ship losses to missiles (?)
Moskva
On 14 April 2022 Russia reported the sinking of the Moskva, a guided missile cruiser and the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, east of Snake Island and about 50 nautical miles from the Ukrainian coast.
The Russians have not stated the cause of initial damage to the ship. The Ukrainians claim to have hit the ship with two Neptune cruise missiles on 13 April. Regardless of the cause of the initial fire, the Russians say the ship sunk the next day after the detonation of some ammunition on the ship.
“As the result of a fire on the Moskva missile cruiser, ammunition detonated. The ship was seriously damaged,” the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement. “The crew was completely evacuated.” (gcaptain.com8)
There has been much debate over this sinking, since warheads the size of those in the Neptune missile are not generally thought powerful enough to sink a naval vessel this large. However, poor damage control procedures (or just a lucky hit in the right location) can lead to the loss of a ship to damage that does not initially seem so serious.
Although the Ukrainians appear to have a working Neptune anti-ship system, that wasn’t the system used to sink another vessel in the same general area two months later.
Spasatel Vasiliy Bekh
As already mentioned, Bill LaPlante at the Pentagon has stated that two Russian warships were sunk using Harpoon missiles at the end of May, although the Ukrainians haven’t claimed any ships sunk at that time.
They do claim, and the Russian navy has confirmed, the sinking of a Russian naval vessel in mid-June by two Harpoon missiles.
That ship was a 1,200 ton rescue tug which is unarmed, but may have been carrying supplies for Russian ground forces. With no defensive weapons and a top speed of 14 knots, its sinking would not be a difficult task for two Harpoon missiles with 500 lb. warheads, and designed to sink much larger ships.
Spasatel Vasiliy Bekh, a Russian naval tugboat, was delivering weapons and personnel to Snake Island when it was struck last Friday. The vessel had a Tor-M2MK anti-aircraft missile system on board but it was not clear if it was being transported to the Russian-controlled island or whether it was acting as an air defence for the tug. (The Times UK9)
The Russians haven’t stated what the tug was doing in the area east of Snake Island. The missile system being referenced in the article is a self-contained system that can be crane loaded onto a ship, so the presence of a crane on the Spasatel Vasiliy Bekh could explain the use of a new and fairly valuable rescue tug to deliver equipment to the island.
It’s clear that a combination of mines and missiles could be used to block naval and commercial ships in the Kerch Strait and the northern Sea of Azov. Prior to 2014 Ukraine possessed a significant number of each, but lost those assets when the Russians seized Crimea.
But with control of the Sea of Azov and Crimea, and with the only significant naval forces in the Black Sea, Russia now controls merchant shipping in this area.
The last point of interest is the Turkish Straits.
The Montreux Convention
Transit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean is through the Turkish Straits, which are inside Turkey.
Passage through the straits is controlled by Turkey per the Montreux Convention, in effect since 1936. The convention allows complete freedom of commercial shipping in times of peace, but there are strict limitations on access by naval vessels.
For warships, the peacetime rules are different depending on whether countries are riparian or not. Riparian States are countries which border the Black Sea (Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and of course Turkey).
In wartime (if Turkey is not involved) warships cannot pass through the straits except to return to base. If Turkey is at war, the country may make any decision it wants about passage of warships.
The Turkish government provides a brief, clear explanation of the Convention. The page explains Turkey’s implementation of the convention, although the specifics about aircraft carriers in the convention itself are a bit more complicated than the blunt interpretation given here.
According to the Montreux Convention, merchant vessels enjoy freedom of passage through the Turkish Straits (Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Services Centre regulates the passages according to the Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits dated 1998), while passages of vessels of war are subject to some restrictions which vary depending on whether these vessels belong to Black Sea riparian States or not.
Besides some general restrictions applicable to all, vessels of war belonging to non-riparian States are subject to specific restrictions such as those regarding maximum aggregate tonnage and duration of stay in the Black Sea.
Some of the important rules for warships during peacetime are:
No aircraft carriers may pass through the straits.
Only submarines of riparian states may pass through the straits, and only for the purpose of rejoining their base or for repair in dockyards outside the Black Sea.
Warships of non-riparian states can only remain in the Black Sea for a maximum of 21 days.
A single non-riparian state can only have a total of 30,000 tons of warships (combined) in the Black Sea at one time.
In February Turkey officially declared the fighting in Ukraine a war, and stated they would be implementing the convention.10 As a result, Russian warships can only transit the straits if they are returning to base and the warships of other, non-riparian nations can't pass through at all.
This makes the loss of the Moskva more significant, since passage through the Turkish Straits is the only way to get that large of a naval vessel into the Black Sea.
Summary
The annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave Russia control of the Kerch Strait between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In seizing Crimea the Russians also obtained hundreds of mines, plus most of the Ukrainian anti-ship missile systems.
Ukraine, with few coastal defenses left, developed their own system based on a Soviet design, and deliveries of these systems began about the time the war began. They may have successfully used one of the first systems to sink a large warship, despite that warship having defensive systems designed to counter that type of missile.
Ukraine is also receiving Harpoon systems from NATO countries, and has already used one of those systems to sink a Russian naval vessel (although this one likely had no defensive weapons).
Now possessing the entire region around the Sea of Azov, plus its Black Sea Fleet, Russia controls commercial shipping in the Black Sea and their own vessels can move freely between Rostov and the north end of the Turkish Straits.
As long as Turkey continues to follow the Montreux Convention, all merchant vessels can transit through the Turkish Straits, but all warships are barred saving those which are returning to their home ports in the Black Sea.
Update: 14 October
The odds of Turkey closing the Turkish Straits to all Russian vessels just dropped to slightly above zero. According to an AP article11 this morning, Russia and Turkey have agreed to start making Turkey the main hub for natural gas from Russia.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Friday that Turkey and Russia have instructed their respective energy authorities to immediately begin technical work on a Russian proposal that would turn Turkey into a gas hub for Europe. (AP)
Although a NATO member, Turkey is much more impacted economically by Russia than by the NATO countries, and once this project is completed the economic futures of both countries will be even more intertwined.
The Turks will also have a very strong incentive to give the Russians unrestricted access to the Mediterranean and in the future, it’s possible Turkey will be a de jure NATO member but a de facto Russian ally, and might even give up its membership entirely.
This part of the article was also very interesting, less for what it says about Russia and Turkey and more for what it says about the AP:
Germany this week rejected another proposal by Putin to step up gas flows to Europe via a link of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline under the Baltic Sea — a pipeline that has never been operational. Moscow cut off the parallel Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline over what it claimed were technical problems. (AP)
It’s true that Nord Stream 2 has never been operational (it was completed but not yet carrying gas) and Russia has been using gas shipments as leverage with the EU, but there’s no mention in the AP article of the recent attack on both Nord Stream pipelines.
Local authorities have confirmed the attack but the source behind it is still unknown. It’s not clear whether the Russians have planned all along to stop gas flows directly to northern Europe, or if another country is trying to interfere with Russia economically.
But this omission, combined with the quote above, could lead the AP’s readers to a conclusion not yet justified by the available evidence, and possibly the opposite of what’s actually driving the deal. The attack on Nord Stream is extremely relevant in the context of this article, and it’s omission is something one would expect from a propaganda outlet, not from a news service.
gCaptain article about Odessa blockade:
https://gcaptain.com/maritime-sea-blockade-ukraine/
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220307133156/https://gcaptain.com/maritime-sea-blockade-ukraine/
https://www.world-grain.com/articles/17016-odessa-official-ukraine-needs-help-to-break-russian-blockade
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220609145040/https://www.world-grain.com/articles/17016-odessa-official-ukraine-needs-help-to-break-russian-blockade
Kyiv post 2 August, on Neptune missile system:
https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/neptune-cruise-missiles-can-protect-ukraines-shores.html
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/neptune-cruise-missiles-can-protect-ukraines-shores.html
Kyiv post 15 March, on Neptune missile system:
https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraines-navy-acquires-first-neptune-cruise-missiles.html?cn-reloaded=1
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraines-navy-acquires-first-neptune-cruise-missiles.html?cn-reloaded=1
Article about Harpoon missile system:
https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/Harpoon
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220626193113/https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/Harpoon
Janes article about Danish Harpoon system:
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/naval-weapons/latest/ukraine-crisis-denmark-to-provide-harpoon-missile-system-to-ukraine
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220524200615/https://www.janes.com/defence-news/naval-weapons/latest/ukraine-crisis-denmark-to-provide-harpoon-missile-system-to-ukraine
Defense One article about U.S. training Ukrainian troops:
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/us-trained-ukrainian-missileers-who-sunk-russian-warship-pentagon-official-says/376808/
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220907161034/https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/us-trained-ukrainian-missileers-who-sunk-russian-warship-pentagon-official-says/376808/
gCaptain article about the Moskva:
https://gcaptain.com/ammo-blast-russian-navy-flagship/
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220414022156/https://gcaptain.com/ammo-blast-russian-navy-flagship/
Times UK article about the sinking of the Spasatel Vasiliy Bekh:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-sinks-russian-ship-with-western-weapons-zr8bzmbgw
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220621141510/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-sinks-russian-ship-with-western-weapons-zr8bzmbgw
Article about Turkey implementing the Montreux Convention:
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-02-27/turkey-to-implement-international-pact-on-access-to-shipping-straits-due-to-ukraine-war
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220228031535/https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-02-27/turkey-to-implement-international-pact-on-access-to-shipping-straits-due-to-ukraine-war
AP article about Russian/Turkish gas deal:
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-turkey-1c4a85eb7bf73314d703ad48bdb77c0e
Archived copy:
https://web.archive.org/web/20221014164148/https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-turkey-1c4a85eb7bf73314d703ad48bdb77c0e